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COMMENTS 
HOW THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION CAN INFORM ITS 
INDIAN LAND POLICIES IN LIGHT OF HISTORICAL 
BREAKDOWNS 
Shae Weathersbee
*
 
Introduction 
Before President Donald J. Trump had been sworn in, rumors began 
floating around that Trump’s administration planned on privatizing Indian 
lands.
1
 An initial news article indicated that advisors to Trump were 
pushing this policy to allow for more lucrative oil extraction, an idea that 
spun internet-users into debates.
2
 In the first two years of the Trump 
administration, it is evident that President Trump is aiming to decrease the 
bureaucracy that has limited tribes in pursuit of economic development.
3
 
The extent the administration will go to ease access to tribal resources is 
unclear. This Comment aims to elaborate the policy of the Trump 
administration regarding Indian lands in order to analyze its potential 
ramifications in Indian Country. The policy presented in this Comment has 
been formulated based on the administration’s statements and actions 
regarding Indian Country. Potential impacts of the policy will be explored 
through two case studies, providing real-world consequences of changing 
Indian land policies. 
I. Background 
One of the first articles regarding the privatization of Indian land was 
published on December 5, 2016,
4
 and the very next day, Oklahoma 
Representative Markwayne Mullin issued a response that attempted to settle 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Reuters, Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize Untapped Oil Reserves on Native 
American Reservations, FORTUNE (Dec. 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/05/donald-
trump-oil-reservations/ [hereinafter Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Remarks at a Tribal, State, and Local Energy Roundtable Discussion and an 
Exchange with Reporters, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (June 28, 2017) [hereinafter 
Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable]. 
 4. Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize, supra note 1. 
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the fears such articles induced.
5
 Mullin, then recently named the chair of 
Trump’s Native American Coalition, indicated that the actual focus of the 
administration was to “end the overreaching paternalism that has held 
American Indians back from being the drivers of their own destiny.”6 
Mullin elaborated on this proposal by suggesting that privatization was not 
the mechanism to effectuate this purpose; rather, it was the removal of 
restrictions on the utilization of Indian lands.
7
 Mullin asserted that seeking 
the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Land 
Management should not be required for tribes to utilize their lands.
8
 
The response of the Native American Coalition did not placate the 
growing concerns of some Americans, who recognized that President 
Trump’s pro-business policies could lead to great changes surrounding 
Indian trust lands.
9
 News sources reported that while reservations only 
encompass around two percent of land in the United States, they are alleged 
to entail twenty percent of the country’s oil and gas resources.10 The Trump 
administration’s stance against heavy regulation seemed to substantiate 
rumors that Indian lands would be privatized to remove regulations and 
federal bureaucracy surrounding mineral leases and other forms of 
development.
11
 Leaders in Indian Country stood divided on the idea of 
privatizing lands to make way for more development.
12
 Some leaders totally 
opposed such efforts, as they would lead tribes down a path of 
commodification that was against spiritual beliefs.
13
 There was a further 
fear that privatization would herald a new Termination Era and be yet 
another attempt of the United States to remove tribal sovereignty in pursuit 
                                                                                                             
 5. Christine Powell, Trump Adviser Says He’s Not Privatizing Tribal Land, LAW 360 
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/869536/trump-adviser-says-he-s-not-
privatizing-tribal-land (internal citation omitted). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Hayley Miller, Trump’s Policies Show Profound Disregard for Native Americans, 
DNC Chair Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
trump-native-americans-tom-perez_us_59889853e4b0ca8b1d49e6df.  
 10. Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize, supra note 1. 
 11. Miller, supra note 9. 
 12. Valerie Volcovici, Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize Oil-Rich Indian Reservations, 
REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tribes-insight/trump-
advisors-aim-to-privatize-oil-rich-indian-reservations-idUSKBN13U1B1. 
 13. Id. 
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of economic gains.
14
 With $1.5 trillion worth of resources on the line, it 
appeared that many parties would want a say in this debate.
15
 
In the summer of 2017, more news articles were published in response to 
the Trump administration’s treatment of Native American issues in the first 
months of the presidency. Politicians such as Democratic National 
Committee Chair, Tom Perez, spoke out, claiming the administration’s 
continued promotion of the privatization of lands was comparable to the 
“‘catastrophic’ Eisenhower-era policy.”16 Perez asserted that since 
President Nixon, the presidents of this country have supported “self-
determination without termination,” yet this presidency appeared to be 
parting with this position by not only supporting the privatization of Indian 
lands but also by questioning the legitimacy of federal housing block grants 
for Indians, enabling via executive order the expansion of drilling in the 
Atlantic and Arctic, planning a wall that would run through Indian Country, 
and proposing a budget that cut approximately $300 million from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
17
 Other news articles similarly reiterated Trump’s 
plans on the privatization of Indian Country.
18
 
As news sources indicated that privatization remained on the table, 
arguments developed on both sides, with supporters of privatization 
heralding the freedom such action would bring. Excessive bureaucracy 
would not burden Indians when trying to seek profit from natural 
resources.
19
 Mortgages could be taken out more easily on lands for capital, 
removing the paternalistic hand of the federal government.
20
 However, 
voices on the other side worried that this plan seemed far too familiar and 
recalled the days of termination wherein tribes lost millions of acres of land 
and even tribal recognition in some cases.
21
 Without trust land and federal 
oversight, some fear the elimination of tribal sovereignty because there will 
be no physical location for a tribe to assert jurisdiction.
22
 Tribal members 
may be forced to assimilate into society at large.
23
 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Miller, supra note 9. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Tom Perez, Opinion, Trump Is Breaking the Federal Government’s Promises to 
Native Americans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
perez-native-american-indians-trump-20170807-story.html. 
 19. Volcovici, supra note 12. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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II. The Trump Administration’s Course of Action 
To best predict the future actions of the Trump administration and the 
changes Indian Country is likely to face, it is important to analyze actions 
taken by both the executive and legislative branches. Considering the 
actions of both branches will indicate the extent to which Trump policies 
will be carried out and the shape these policies will assume. 
A. Executive Action 
President Donald Trump’s policies towards Indian Country encompass 
the same overarching principles as his plans for the United States at large, 
with the added complication of federal obligations owed to the tribes. Since 
taking office, Trump has consistently vocalized the goal of American 
energy dominance.
24
 The President’s actions in the first year of his 
presidency aimed to increase access to the nation’s energy resources, 
attempting to provide room for American ingenuity to flourish.
25
 This 
policy has intended to promote the American economy in order to pay off 
the national debt and to provide thousands of additional jobs to American 
citizens.
26
  
While news sources report that Trump still aims to privatize lands, 
presidential documents indicate only that the administration wishes to 
reduce regulations surrounding land utilization. President Trump, in several 
proclamations and memoranda, has emphasized a need to cut the 
bureaucratic thicket to enable tribes to have better access to natural 
resources.
27
 He has asserted a plan to limit the need for approval before 
development can take place and has hinted at the removal of restraints on 
alienation of Indian lands.
28
 At the same time, the administration has 
attempted to come to terms with how to balance tribal self-determination 
with the responsibilities the federal government owes to the tribes.
29
  
                                                                                                             
 24. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3; Remarks on Signing an 
Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 2017 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
 25. Remarks on Signing an Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth, supra note 24, at 1; Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 
28, 2017). 
 26. Remarks on Signing an Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth, supra note 24, at 1. 
 27. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 1. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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The administration has voiced its desire to transform the relationship 
between tribes and the federal government. Trump indicated that the United 
States is stronger when Indian Country is strong.
30
 Reformations in Indian 
Country are necessary to achieve goals elsewhere.
31
 President Trump 
announced in October of 2017 that his administration is pursuing 
“aggressive regulatory reform” in Indian affairs and aims to promote a 
“government-to-government” relationship between tribes and the federal 
government.
32
 Despite the administration’s recognition of the importance of 
tribal sovereignty to the health of Indian Country, actions by the 
administration have been mixed, making it difficult to discern the 
administration’s future actions. 
The Trump administration has supported cooperative economic growth 
in Indian Country, but support began largely as remarks and memoranda. 
President Trump and Secretary of Energy Rick Perry’s remarks at the 
Tribal, State, and Local Energy Roundtable indicated a desire for greater 
cooperation between all levels of government to allow utilization of energy 
reserves that have previously been left dormant.
33
 Trump stated that 
“unlocking vast treasures of energy reserves” would mean “creat[ing] new 
prosperity” for Americans.34 Beyond statements, Trump issued the first 
Presidential Emergency Declaration on behalf of a tribal nation.
35
 This 
declaration aimed to assure the Seminole Tribe of Florida that the United 
States would support its rebuilding effort after Hurricane Irma.
36
 With 
Trump taking actions such as ending the moratorium on coal leasing on 
federal lands and pursuing the repeal of the Obama Administration’s Clean 
Power Plan and Stream Protection Rule, it appears it may not be long 
before the administration takes further deregulatory measures in Indian 
Country.
37
 
Recently, the Trump administration has turned words into action via the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. In December of 2017, President Trump signed into 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Proclamation 9669-National Native American Heritage Month, 2017 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 31, 2017). 
 33. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 2. 
 34. Id. at 1. 
 35. Seminole Tribe of Florida; Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 46813 (Oct. 6, 2017). 
 36. Proclamation 9669-National Native American Heritage Month, supra note 32, at 1. 
 37. President Donald J. Trump Unleashes America’s Energy Potential, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-unleashes-americas-energy-potential/. 
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law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.
38
 Of particular relevance is the 
Opportunity Zones Program, a bipartisan effort included in the Act that 
comprises part of the President’s “comprehensive tax reform plan.”39 The 
program attempts to address the lack of economic development in 
underserved parts of the country.
40
 In order to effectuate this goal, the 
enacted program utilizes tax incentives to draw investment to the areas that 
need it most—including Native communities.41 Oklahoma Native American 
Affairs Secretary Chris Benge was “pleased” that the zones will “provide a 
range of opportunities for investors to collaborate with many of the tribal 
nations.”42 As of April 2018, a variety of legislators have voiced support for 
this attempt to bring together public policy and private investment to create 
real-world change.
43
 
In March of 2018, the Trump administration vocalized support for 
increased access to treatment in light of the opioid epidemic and pushed for 
concrete improvements in access to healthcare.
44
 Most notably, with regards 
to Indian affairs, President Trump has supported increased funding for the 
Department of Health and Human Services.
45
 President Trump’s proposed 
Federal Budget requested $3 billion in additional funding for 2018 and $10 
billion for 2019.
46
 Contained in the allocations of this additional funding are 
provisions for resources to increase access to treatment and recovery in 
Native communities.
47
 
In contrast with the above statements of Indian self-determination, the 
administration has supported highly controversial energy projects affecting 
                                                                                                             
 38. John Wagner, Trump Signs Sweeping Tax Bill into Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/12/22/trump-signs-
sweeping-tax-bill-into-law/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b290fd198b9f; Budget Fiscal Year, 
2018, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 39. President Donald J. Trump Is Expanding Entrepreneurial Opportunity in 
Underserved Communities, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-expanding-entrepreneurial-opportunity-
underserved-communities/. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. WTAS: Support for the Trump Administration’s Approval of Opportunity Zones, 
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/wtas-
support-trump-administrations-approval-opportunity-zones/. 
 43. Id. 
 44. How We Will Win the War on Opioids, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/articles/will-win-war-opioids/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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Indian Country in pursuit of American energy dominance. After being 
stalled, the Dakota Access Pipeline was expedited by executive order.
48
 The 
memoranda released accompanying the action indicated the 
administration’s intentions to minimize regulatory hurdles to expedite “high 
priority energy and infrastructure projects that will create jobs and increase 
national security.”49 Although the project was predicted to have great 
economic benefits, highly visible protests presented the project’s potential 
negative impacts, including interfering with Native American sacred sites 
and contaminating the Standing Rock Reservation’s drinking water.50  
It does not appear that the administration has accounted for tribal 
religious practice when making decisions regarding the utilization of 
federal lands. In December of 2017, President Trump modified Bears Ears 
National Monument to include less land area.
51
 After determining the 
amount of land set aside exceeded what was required under law to protect 
cultural resources, President Trump ordered a reduction in size of the 
monument.
52
 This decision is indicative of a desire to open federal land for 
alternative use, despite the protests of tribal groups who believe the 
decision will adversely impact their cultural or religious practices. 
The construction of a wall along the southern border of the United States, 
an element of the Trump administration’s immigration policy, evidences the 
willingness of the administration to encroach on tribal sovereignty when 
national security interests are involved.
53
 The Tohono O’odham Nation 
encompasses part of the United States’ border with Mexico.54 The Tribe has 
made previous agreements with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol to 
allow for the construction of a fence and access to guard it.
55
 However, the 
proposed border wall would cut directly through tribal land without the 
Tribe’s consent.56 In July of 2017, the House of Representatives approved 
                                                                                                             
 48. Exec. Order No. 13766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
 49. President Trump Takes Action to Expedite Priority Energy and Infrastructure 
Projects, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ 
president-trump-takes-action-expedite-priority-energy-infrastructure-projects/. 
 50. Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, TIME 
(Oct. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux/. 
 51. Proclamation No. 9681: Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 58081, 58085 (Dec. 4, 2017). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Perez, supra note 18. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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the allocation of $1.6 billion to begin construction of the wall.
57
 In January 
of 2018, news sources reported that Trump was planning a visit to examine 
border wall prototypes.
58
  Also in January of 2018, President Trump sought  
an additional $18 billion from Congress to build the wall.
59
 The Trump 
administration has reaffirmed its commitment to continue with plans to 
build a wall as recently as the summer of 2018.
60
 
Despite a lack of presidential statements on the matter, tribes have 
nonetheless begun feeling pressure to privatize tribal lands. In May of 2017, 
Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke proclaimed that there should be an 
“off-ramp” to get tribal lands out of trust.61 During further remarks at the 
National Tribal Energy Summit, Zinke asserted that if tribes had an option 
between lands staying in trust or becoming incorporated, the tribes would 
choose incorporation.
62
 Commentators have indicated that the 
administration further wishes to depart with previous administrations’ 
Indian policies based on verbiage in the signing statement of House Bill 
244.
63
 The signing statement asserts that the administration will afford 
benefits that are based on race or ethnicity in “a manner consistent with the 
requirement to afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.”64 The statement 
specifically mentions Native American Housing Block Grants, an action 
commentators have interpreted to indicate that federal provisions based on 
Indian status may be at risk despite the class being previously determined 
political and not racial.
65
 
Although members of Trump’s Native American Coalition have come 
forth and said privatization of Indian lands is not the route the Department 
of the Interior plans to take, statements as recent as the fall of 2017 indicate 
the President’s intentions to modify the ability of Native Americans to 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
 58. Rebecca Shabad, Trump to Visit Border Wall Prototypes in San Diego: Report, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/trump-to-visit-border-wall-
prototypes-in-san-diego-report/. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Remarks by President Trump at a Lunch with Members of Congress, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
lunch-members-congress/. 
 61. Perez, supra note 18. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 3 (May 5, 2017). 
 65. Perez, supra note 18. 
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utilize lands.
66
 The collection of memoranda and orders released by the 
Trump administration indicates a focus on stimulating economic growth 
amongst Indians by deregulating their utilization of trust lands in order to 
promote the overall economic well-being of the United States. In this 
process, Indian interests may be outweighed by the administration’s policy 
of pursuing American energy dominance. The administration may favor the 
privatization or deregulation of Indian lands to remove the disparate 
treatment of Indians, as viewed by mainstream America, from that of the 
rest of the population. 
B. Legislative Action 
In contrast to the Trump administration’s statements about equal 
treatment, Carcieri v. Salazar declared that the land-into-trust provision of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) was only applicable to tribes 
that were federally recognized at the time of the IRA’s enactment.67 
Therefore, only tribes recognized by 1934 have been able to take land into 
trust and pursue the other programs under the Act.
68
 The extent to which the 
IRA applies to tribes that were later recognized remains uncertain.
69
 This 
means that expensive litigation, costing taxpayers large sums, continues 
while development is inhibited.
70
 Legislative fixes have been considered, 
including recent House Bills 130 and 131 introduced in January of 2017.
71
 
House Bill 130 would reassert the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to 
take land into trust for all federally recognized tribes, without regard to 
their date of recognition.
72
 House Bill 131 holds in place the lands already 
in trust.
73
 As of July of 2018, these bills have not moved past introduction.
74
 
                                                                                                             
 66. Proclamation 9669-National Native American Heritage Month, supra note 32, at 1. 
 67. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 390-91 (2009) (discussing Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5129)). 
 68. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, POLICY UPDATE 5 (2017), http://www.ncai.org/ 
attachments/PolicyPaper_zZTmwUgiMOBFwXQKgNIDMPzHsGLyRoEArzrzjCwRJtJznx
BGJFJ_Annual%20Policy%20Update%202017%20-%20Final%2010.13.pdf. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 6. 
 71. H.R. 130, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017); H.R. 131, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017). 
 72. H.R. 130 § 1. 
 73. H.R. 131 § 1. 
 74. H.R. 130 Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/ 
house-bill/130 (last visited July 27, 2018);  H.R. 131 Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/131?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R 
%3E+131%22%5D%7D&r=2 (last visited July 27, 2018).  
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In accordance with President Trump’s emphasis on collective decision-
making, the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and 
Alaska Native Affairs undertook an oversight hearing that was meant to 
address concerns with the modern implementation of the provisions of the 
IRA.
75
 Particularly, the Subcommittee vocalized concerns with the land-
into-trust provision, stating “the Secretary has acquired land in trust 
regardless of the impact on . . . tribes, states and local governments, and 
landowners, and regardless of the capacity of the government to manage the 
trust lands.”76 Uncertainty still remains regarding the extent of the 
Secretary’s authority to take lands into trust and what factors must be 
considered in such decisions.
77
 The Department of the Interior has 
promulgated proposed changes to land acquisition to tribal leaders.
78
 The 
proposals aim to make decisions more predictable but increase the 
requirements for application of off-reservation land-into-trust 
applications.
79
 
Legislative attempts to limit the amounts of dormant federal land 
reinforce Trump’s plans to utilize American energy resources. House Bill 
621, also known as the Disposal of Excess Federal Lands Act of 2017, 
meant to sell more than 3.3 million acres of federal land.
80
 After opposition 
to the measure by sportsmen groups, statements have been made that the 
legislation will be withdrawn.
81
 Although this specific bill might not be 
taken any further, its proposal indicates that other similar plans may be 
taken to utilize previously dormant federal land.
82
 
The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act (ITARA), enacted in 2016, provided 
a first step in modernizing the trust system and is harmonious with the 
Trump administration’s deregulatory policy.83 The Act lets tribes make 
choices about how to utilize their land, allowing tribal action without 
federal approval in some cases.
84
 Approvals can delay development for 
decades.
85
 ITARA strikes against part of the bureaucratic thicket by limiting 
                                                                                                             
 75. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 6. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. Id. at 6-7. 
 80. H.R. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); see NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 
7. 
 81. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 7. 
 82. Id. at 6. 
 83. Indian Trust Asset Reform Act § 205, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5614 (West 2016). 
 84. Id. § 205(b), 25 U.S.C.A. § 5614(b). 
 85. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 10. 
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the number of steps that need to be taken to develop lands.
86
 The legislation 
particularly impacts the Office of the Special Trustee (OST), which reviews 
all appraisals of trust transactions.
87
 ITARA calls for the Department of the 
Interior (DOI) to work with tribal governments to create plans that 
reallocate functions of the OST to other bureaus or offices, minimizing 
OST oversight.
88
 The Act empowers the DOI to create minimum criteria for 
entities to appraise or valuate trust lands.
89
 The Act authorizes the Secretary 
of the Interior to appoint an Under Secretary for Indian Affairs, who would 
be the first official in the DOI with powers in BIA agencies and non-Indian 
agencies.
90
 This “cross-agency advocate” would ensure Indian interests are 
included in all discussions throughout the DOI.
91
 
Recent legislation involving Indian affairs has largely centered around 
economic development, a key Indian policy priority for the Trump 
administration. In March of 2018, the Native American Business Incubators 
Program Act passed the Senate.
92
 If enacted, this bill would require the 
Department of the Interior to establish a grant program to create and operate 
business incubators tasked with serving Native communities.
93
 These 
incubators would support small Native businesses by helping them acquire 
the resources they need to be successful.
94
 Another bill that has moved past 
the introductory phase is the Indian Community Economic Enhancement 
Act of 2018.
95
 Passed in the Senate in March of 2018, the bill amends the 
Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism 
Act of 2000 and calls upon the Office of Native American Business 
Development (ONABD) to increase support of tribal economic 
development.
96
 Among other provisions, the bill would require the ONABD 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at 11. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Indian Trust Asset Reform Act § 304, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5634. 
 89. Id. § 305, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5635. 
 90. Id. § 303, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5633; see also NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 
68, at 11. 
 91. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 11. 
 92. S. 607, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 607 – Native American Business Incubators Program 
Act Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/607 
(last visited July 27, 2018). 
 93. S. 607 § 4(a). 
 94. Id. 
 95. S. 1116, 115th Cong. (2017); S.1116 – Indian Community Economic Enhancement 
Act of 2018 Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/1116 (last visited July 27, 2018). 
 96. Id. 
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to advise the Department of Commerce on the relationship between Indians 
and the federal government and require ONABD to act as the point of 
contact for tribes inquiring about economic development and business on 
Indian land.
97
 The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs and 
the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund are tasked with 
collaborating on projects to support tribal economic development.
98
 
C. Additional Considerations 
Of interest to the Trump administration and Congress, energy resources 
on tribal lands serve a dual function of both enabling tribal development 
and supplying the United States with greater domestic energy sources.
99
 
However, unlike resources outside of Indian lands, tribal resources face 
greater difficulties in development.
100
 Federal approvals, bureaucracy, and 
financial limitations, among other factors, mean that it takes longer to 
develop resources on tribal lands. Indian energy policy has not been 
significantly changed in ten years.
101
 Potential amendments to the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, proposed by the 
Senate in January of 2017, would provide additional resources to enable 
greater tribal control over development of various energy sources.
102
 The 
bill and proposed amendments seek to streamline approval processes and 
extend access to programs.
103
 The proposed Native American Energy Act of 
2017 (House Bill 210) further aims to reduce obstacles to energy 
development by encouraging standardized procedures and implementing 
time limitations for secretarial approval.
104
 Additionally, the proposed 
legislation includes the ability for tribes to waive appraisal requirements 
and dictates that the Secretary of the Interior is to enter into agreements 
with tribes to implement demonstration projects targeted at developing 
energy production.
105
 
The proposed legislation since President Trump took office largely 
echoes the executive branch’s goals. Both branches appear to support some 
level of deregulation of Indian land use and portray a desire to promote 
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Indian self-determination and economic development. This could mean that 
action, beyond mere words, is more likely to be taken under Trump’s 
presidency. However, it is important to note that it has been ten years since 
major reformations have been made to Indian energy policy.
106
 Therefore, it 
may take time for the promulgation of new legislation to reinforce the 
shared goals of the legislative and executive branches. 
III. Case Studies 
In order to fully understand the impacts that changes to policies 
regarding Indian lands may have, it is essential to look at similar past 
policies. Analyzing previous policies helps to prevent the repetition of 
tragic consequences, ensuring that modern policies are refined by historical 
knowledge. The Termination Era is an informative first case study because 
it presents the consequences of removing federal oversight from tribal land 
holdings. Additionally, some of the criticizers of the Trump 
administration’s Indian policies have likened them to those of the 
Termination Era.
107
 Analysis of the Termination Era will shed light on the 
fairness of these critiques.  
The Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) provides 
additional insight into the results of changes in alienation of land in pursuit 
of American energy development and will serve as another useful case 
study. Analyzing the impacts of this policy will be highly relevant to 
policies endorsed by Trump because the corporations that resulted from 
ANCSA are possible models for the privatization of Indian lands. This 
corporate structure serves as an example of how tribes can engage in the 
energy market. ANCSA further indicates how forced action by the federal 
government can create indefinite limitations on tribal sovereignty. 
Each of the case study sections will first explore the background of the 
policy and then move on to the statutory framework. After the immediate 
and long-term impacts of the policy are explored, these insights will be 
applied to President Trump’s policies. 
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A. Termination Era 
1. Background and Goals 
Before the Termination Era, the Reorganization Era attempted to balance 
the competing goals of autonomy and assimilation in Indian affairs.
108
 The 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was the centerpiece of the era.
109
 The Act 
attempted to approximate institutions found within American society at 
large on reservations.
110
 This included the promotion of the creation of 
tribal constitutions and bylaws, which mirrored that of the American 
government.
111
 Tribes were encouraged to retain cultural practices and 
customs.
112
 The Act prevented reservation land from being sold into non-
Indian ownership.
113
 Despite the attempted compromise, Indians were 
unsatisfied with the policy’s promotion of Western ideals of government 
and the great federal oversight of tribal actions on reservations.
114
 During 
the mid-1940s, it became evident that the measures Congress and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had taken in order to advance the ultimate 
goal of assimilating Native Americans was largely unsuccessful.
115
 The 
dissatisfaction of Indians, the cost of administering the IRA, and a change 
of power within the BIA initiated a policy shift.
116
 Subcommittees of 
Congress began to investigate plans to relieve tribes of the control of the 
BIA.
117
 
Termination was partially a product of the United States attempting to 
distance itself from racial classifications that were invoked by Germany 
during World War II. In an address to the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, President Truman asserted that “[t]here is 
no justifiable reason for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or 
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race, or color.”118 Truman’s election ushered in a “liberal assimilationist 
trend.”119 Fair Deal policies focused on promoting civil rights and economic 
progress to ensure the integration of minorities within American society.
120
 
Overall, the drive for civil rights in this era intended to “free[] the 
individual from supposedly invidious group identity, especially that of race, 
so that he or she could compete freely and form associations voluntarily in 
the great society.”121 The Truman administration saw the reservation system 
as segregating Native Americans from the rest of society and called for 
what would eventually be the goal of the Eisenhower termination policy—
ensuring that Indians were placed in the same position in society as other 
Americans.
122
 
2. Statutory Framework 
Termination became the general policy of the federal government with 
the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108), which was 
bolstered by additional acts that eliminated the trust relationship between 
specific tribes and the federal government.
123
 Public Law 280 (PL 280) 
enabled electing states to assume some civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
tribes, essentially displacing the previous federal and tribal control over 
such matters.
124
 Educational programs promoted assimilation and affected 
Indian lands were relieved of restraints on alienation.
125
 Relocation 
programs aimed at moving reservation Indians to other areas.
126
 
Congress asserted its intentions with regards to Indians in the text of 
HCR 108, calling for Indians to be “subject to the same laws and entitled to 
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of 
the United States.”127 Although this resolution had no true power of 
enforceability and was simply a policy statement, this viewpoint retained 
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influence in the individual acts of termination that followed.
128
 Under the 
authority of these acts, the Secretary of the Interior developed plans that 
terminated the historic federal-tribal relationship for the affected tribe.
129
 
These acts contained some similar provisions.
130
 The structure of land 
ownership changed and often entailed tribal land being sold.
131
 The trust 
relationship that enabled tribes to receive aid in resource management and 
protected tribal lands from leaving tribal ownership was terminated.
132
 
States gained legislative jurisdiction over many subject areas of tribal 
concern.
133
 Criminal and civil matters arising amongst Indians of the 
terminated tribe were directed to state court.
134
 Tribes no longer benefitted 
from exemption from state taxes.
135
 Federal programs directed towards 
tribes were extinguished.
136
 Federal programs created specifically for tribal 
members ended.
137
 The loss of tribal lands effectively ended tribal 
sovereignty, as tribes had no land over which to assert jurisdiction.
138
 
Although nothing in the termination acts specifically eliminated the 
inherent sovereignty of tribes, no terminated tribe continued to pass or 
enforce laws or preserve tribal courts.
139
 
In 1953, Congress passed PL 280, which aimed at curbing lawlessness 
on reservations while assimilating tribes and decreasing federal spending.
140
 
The Act granted California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin 
criminal and some civil jurisdiction in Indian Country.
141
 Congress placed a 
few limitations on state authority. The Act did not “authorize the alienation, 
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water 
rights” of the tribes over which the Act granted jurisdiction.142 Tribes 
explicitly maintained hunting, fishing, and some property rights if protected 
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by federal statute, treaty, or agreement.
143
 Additional states were provided 
the option of gaining jurisdiction without the consent of the tribe, and this 
offer was not revoked until the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968, when tribal consent became required before states could adopt PL 
280 jurisdiction.
144
 The assumption of jurisdiction by states over tribes 
marked a great change in the federal-tribal relationship that historically 
characterized Indian affairs.
145
  
3. Immediate Impacts 
In all, 109 tribes and bands suffered termination and no less than 
1,362,155 acres of tribal land were impacted by the policy.
146
 The erosion 
of the tribal land base had a large impact on affected Indians in their daily 
lives. The sale of tribal lands meant that Indians had to migrate to find new 
residences.
147
 Indians lacking the education and skill sets required by 
mainstream employers struggled to find jobs.
148
 There was also a persistent 
lack of desire to integrate with mainstream American society that served as 
an obstacle.
149
 Attitudes amongst non-Indian Americans further limited 
employment and socialization prospects.
150
 This difficulty in employment 
was exacerbated by additional financial obligations—taxes—imparted to 
Indians as a result of termination.
151
 All benefits and programs formerly 
provided by the federal government ended, leaving many Indians unable to 
live off of previously provided welfare.
152
 The freedom promised by the 
termination acts in actuality cost tribes sovereignty, while their members 
lost a sense of community.
153
 
A series of programs by BIA Commissioner Dillon Myer further aimed 
at engaging Indians in Western society but ended up having unfortunate 
consequences. Adding to the lost sense of community was the impact of the 
Voluntary Relocation Program that led to Indians moving off of 
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reservations.
154
 This plan, although named “voluntary,” was not always 
reported as such.
155
 Commissioner Myer indicated that the program meant 
to provide employment services and relocation for forty percent of the 
Indian population based on a projection that reservation resources could 
only sustain sixty percent of the population.
156
 The program strived to 
counter the flawed assimilation plans on reservations that tended to focus 
on farming and left Indians in rural poverty.
157
 However, due to monetary 
limits, only a model program was carried out.
158
 In another attempt to 
address poverty, Commissioner Myer removed some of the restraints on 
land in 1951.
159
 Area directors were enabled to issue fee patents and 
approve sale of Indian lands.
160
 Indians were allowed to mortgage land to 
secure loans.
161
 Inflation after the war prompted some Indians to sell land to 
take advantage of the higher selling prices, further reducing Indian 
holdings.
162
 
The growing awareness of the detrimental impact that termination had on 
Indians and tribes meant the policy ended relatively quickly. After the end 
of termination acts in 1962, President Nixon officially repudiated the policy 
in 1969, proposing a new focus on self-determination for Indians.
163
  
4. Long-Term Impacts 
Despite the repudiation of termination policy, Congress has not 
effectively counteracted the impact of termination on tribes that have not 
had their termination acts repealed.
164
 Many of the terminated tribes remain 
terminated today.
165
 Tribes that have regained their federal recognition may 
still be deprived of their reservations.
166
 The Wyandotte, Ottawa, Modoc, 
and Peoria tribes did not regain tribal lands in the Act restoring their federal 
                                                                                                             
 154. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 147. 
 155. Id. at 147-48. 
 156. Kenneth R. Philp, Dillon S. Myer and the Advent of Termination: 1950-1953, 19 W. 
HIST. Q. 37, 48 (1988). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 49. 
 159. Id. at 47. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 47-48. 
 163. Walch, supra note 108, at 1191. 
 164. Id. at 1192. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1192-93. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/3
No. 2] COMMENTS 333 
 
 
recognition.
167
 Land loss impacts a tribe’s ability to govern itself because 
jurisdiction and authority are intimately intertwined with land ownership.
168
 
In addition to the restoration of federal recognition, the Menominee Tribe 
regained land that was under a tribal corporation, which Congress restored 
to reservation status.
169
 However, no compensation was given for land that 
left tribal ownership during termination.
170
 An additional restoration act 
transferred federal land to the Siletz and Paiute Tribe of Utah to establish 
reservations; however, the amount of land given was dictated in one case by 
the economic needs of the Tribe and in another by an arbitrary 
determination.
171
 
Terminated tribes are prohibited from being re-recognized through the 
federal acknowledgment procedure of the BIA.
172
 The current regulation 
detailing federal recognition of unrecognized tribes entails several 
requirements, including that the tribe is not “the subject of congressional 
legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal 
relationship.”173 Tribes never before recognized by the federal government 
can receive federal programs and benefits once approved by the BIA, but 
terminated tribes may not resort to this pathway for federal recognition.
174
 
The impacts of PL 280 have been partially mitigated by provisions of 
Congress, but in the states that have adopted its jurisdiction, tribes must 
yield indefinitely to another sovereign having control over some of its 
affairs. As previously mentioned, the Act prevented state encumbrances on 
Indian trust land and the regulation of hunting and fishing rights dictated by 
federal law.
175
 Tribal ordinances and customs were later “given full force 
and effect” in civil actions where they did not conflict with state law.176 
Bryan v. Itasca County denied states general civil regulatory jurisdiction in 
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Indian Country.
177
 A 1975 report by the United States Department of 
Justice emphasized that despite only covering six states, 359 of the 500 
federally recognized tribes were under the authority of PL 280.
178
 This 
report indicated failures of both state and tribal authorities in assuring 
applicable laws were respected in Indian Country.
179
 Violent crime on 
Indian reservations subject to PL 280 was fifty percent higher than in other 
rural areas of the United States.
180
 A 1999 report by the Justice Department 
indicated that crime rates on reservations under PL 280 were higher than 
that of reservations not under its domain.
181
 This trend may be due to tribes 
under PL 280 no longer receiving support for tribal police forces from the 
BIA.
182
 Coupled with the fact that the federal government does not provide 
aid to states that assume PL 280 jurisdiction, the refusal of funds to tribal 
governments means further breakdown of law enforcement.
183
 
Individual tribal experiences better demonstrate how termination has a 
lasting impact on descendants of terminated tribes. In 1951, the Menominee 
Tribe attained a judgment of $8,500,000 against the United States for 
improper administration of the Menominee Tribal Forest.
184
 The Tribe 
requested that part of the trust fund held by the United States for the Tribe 
be disbursed at a rate of $1500 per capita.
185
 The House passed a bill to 
disburse these funds, but the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs halted the bill 
in the Senate, claiming that if tribal members were able to manage this 
amount of money, then they were not in need of federal supervision.
186
 The 
Tribe was informed of the Senate’s position and told that in order to receive 
the money, the Tribe would have to agree to undergo termination.
187
 The 
General Council of the Menominee Tribe met and decided to undergo 
termination.
188
 This decision was made with the consent of 169 of the 174 
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council members, but a referendum was not created to allow the 
approximately 3000 enrolled members to provide input into arguably one of 
the Tribe’s most important decisions in modern history.189 
Although the Menominee politicians were proud of the passage of the 
Menominee Termination Act in the immediate aftermath of termination, 
tribal members soon realized that the Act carried with it devastating and 
lasting results.
190
 Tribal members feared losing land to new taxes.
191
 Tribal 
members met in opposition to termination, vocalizing their confusion over 
what termination entailed.
192
 The Menominee economy faced crisis.
193
 
Before termination, the Menominee Tribe maintained economic subsistence 
because tribal enterprises were exempt from state regulations and were not 
subject to external taxation.
194
 Termination meant that businesses had to 
expend money to meet state standards.
195
 The previous tax exemptions led 
companies to adopt a business model based on employment maximization, 
not profits.
196
 Individual Menominees became subject to state taxation and 
this reduction in their income threatened subsistence.
197
  
Readily apparent was the depletion of the Tribe’s cash reserve.198 Before 
the passage of the Menominee Termination Act, the government held 
$10,437,000 in trust for the Tribe.
199
 Expenditures such as pre-termination 
studies and improvements to facilities to meet state licensing requirements 
cost the Tribe $12,265,424 by 1960.
200
 Just four years later, the Tribe’s 
account contained only $300,000.
201
 The depleting account meant that 
interest payments decreased and the termination of federal programs led to 
the Tribe having to pay to provide services to tribal members.
202
 Without 
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the interest payments, the Tribe had to rely on the “struggling tribal 
enterprises.”203 
The well-being of tribal members declined as services could no longer be 
provided.
204
 The Tribe had maintained a hospital, but it was forced to 
close.
205
 Federal funding was no longer available after termination and the 
medical facilities had to comply with state regulations.
206
 After spending 
$300,000 attempting to get the facilities in compliance, the system was 
abandoned.
207
 Menominees who did not qualify for welfare or have 
insurance through employment were deprived of healthcare due to the 
expense of private doctors.
208
 Those who did have insurance were faced 
with difficulties reaching care as many tribal members did not have 
transportation.
209
 Fears of discrimination and Western medicine devoid of 
tribal practice meant that many Menominees did not seek treatment.
210
 
When the hospital closed, more than healthcare was sacrificed.
211
 The 
facility had functioned as a social hub where friends conversed and the 
homeless sought shelter.
212
 
The Menominees numbered amongst the few in America who lived 
without electricity or water and the previously lucrative tribal mill did not 
provide assistance. Before termination, tribal members had access to free 
electricity and water.
213
 The Menominee Tribe had actually been selected 
by the federal government for termination because of its relative wealth in 
comparison to other tribes.
214
 After termination, the tribal power plants 
were forced to shut down due to licensing requirements.
215
 Inspection of the 
mill before termination revealed that it contained 132 state code 
violations.
216
 After expending $100,000 to get the plant into compliance, 
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the Tribe encountered management and personnel difficulties.
217
 BIA 
employees formerly directing the mill had to be replaced by private 
managers who were unfamiliar with smaller tribal businesses.
218
  
Attempts by the managers to adopt Western models for larger businesses 
on the reservation failed.
219
 For example, the replacement of tribal trucks 
with larger commercial models led to expansion of tribal roads.
220
 Despite 
this undertaking, the trucks were still unable to be used as they sank into the 
reservation roads.
221
 The work environment shifted as cost-limiting 
practices were employed, focusing the business not on employment but 
rather on profit.
222
 These measures were unable to turn the mill into a 
highly profitable business.
223
 The mill began to lay off workers, leading to a 
difficult search for jobs in surrounding areas.
224
  
Land ownership drastically shifted as termination forced the Tribe to 
implement individual ownership. The Menominee had long regarded 
communal ownership of the land as tying the people to their culture and 
tradition.
225
 Although the termination act did not address the topic of land 
ownership, the tribal government could not resist parceling and selling the 
land.
226
 The land and tribal assets were placed under the authority of 
Menominee Enterprises, Inc.
227
 The board of directors decided to use the 
land for housing and have it appraised and offered to be sold to its current 
occupants.
228
 Many of the occupants could not afford to buy the land they 
lived on.
229
 The land was offered at fair market value, but the aesthetics of 
the land increased its value.
230
 Land was sold to pay taxes, and where taxes 
were not paid, Menominee families were forced to relinquish ownership.
231
 
Menominee people left traditional lands to seek employment in the city.
232
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This action did not always bring prosperity but rather provided merely a 
switch from rural to urban poverty.
233
 
Additional sales of tribal land to outsiders further eroded the tribal land 
base. After other efforts had proven unsuccessful, the Tribe entered an 
agreement to sell land.
234
 There is some doubt the stockholders understood 
the economic development plan they were voting on would result in the sale 
of additional tribal lands to non-members.
235
 A developer was hired who 
created an artificial lake and sold 2600 building sites.
236
 The plan took land 
out of tribal use and required the Tribe to provide additional services, which 
had to be paid for by the land sales.
237
 Though the agreement with the 
developer was terminated, the land loss is still felt.
238
 
Broader consequences of termination affect the identity of tribal 
members to this day. Termination aimed at assimilation, and in this pursuit, 
the Menominee lost elements of culture and connection as a people.
239
 As 
the state was enabled to exercise greater power, the Menominee people 
were denied the level of self-determination the trusteeship of the BIA 
provided for them.
240
 Menominee children born after June 17, 1954, cannot 
be recognized as tribal citizens.
241
 A community once tied together by the 
land began to fracture as people left the reservation in pursuit of work.
242
 
The freedom promised by the termination act actually made the Menominee 
“the wards of many masters.”243 
5. Application to Trump Administration Policies and Goals 
The current climate in the United States is an echo of post-World War II 
attitudes that guided termination policies. President Trump appears to be 
concerned with citizens perceiving disparate treatment based on race.
244
 
Although Indian status is not a racial classification but rather a political 
one, it may be perceived by the general public as a racial category.
245
 The 
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Trump administration has indicated several ways that federally recognized 
Indians are treated differently than non-member Americans. First, tribes 
have less access to their land and energy resources because of complex 
bureaucratic protections.
246
 Second, President Trump has voiced concern 
that Native Americans receive benefits that other minorities do not receive, 
including access to federal programs.
247
 However, although cohesion and 
equality are valid goals, pursuing them in Indian Country is a complex 
process due to the federal-tribal relationship that has not existed with other 
minority groups. 
While reducing federal oversight of tribal actions is a stated goal of the 
Trump administration,
248
 the Termination Era warns that drastic actions will 
have lasting impacts. HCR 108 ushered in the Termination Era and 
promoted the idea that tribal members should be treated in the same way as 
other American citizens.
249
 The goal of integrating tribes into mainstream 
society in effect destroyed tribal sovereignty that existed for thousands of 
years. Termination acts passed in pursuit of the policy led to the sale of the 
tribal land base, as well as to many tribal members leaving traditional 
lands.
250
 Without a land base, the tribes did not have an area to assert 
jurisdiction. Although the termination acts did not explicitly eliminate 
inherent tribal sovereignty, after termination, tribes did not continue to 
assert this power.
251
 Because the tribal-federal relationship was eliminated, 
lands held by tribes and the incomes of tribal members previously gained 
on the reservation became subject to state and federal taxes.
252
 Additionally, 
businesses were under the regulatory authority of the state.
253
 This meant 
that tribes had to expend a great amount of money on taxes from which they 
had previously been shielded. More money was spent on bringing 
businesses up to state codes.
254
 These same effects may be seen today if 
tribal lands are sufficiently deregulated. Lands may be removed from the 
tribal land base and no longer subject to tribal jurisdiction. Tribal members 
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and businesses could be under the domain of state government and may be 
subject to state taxes. 
Trump’s policy of reducing regulatory hurdles in the development of 
tribal land may make access to resources easier, but it is essential that states 
do not take the role the federal government previously asserted. When 
federal power is limited in Indian Country, state authority could likely be 
found permissible. PL 280 enabled states to take over criminal jurisdiction 
and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction from the federal government.
255
 Not only 
did this lead to the heavy utilization of state courts to adjudicate claims the 
tribes would traditionally resolve in culturally appropriate manners, but it 
also led to a gap in enforcement.
256
 When the federal government pulls out 
of programs, funding may go with it. This means that tribes may no longer 
have the resources to provide services or enforce regulations. States may 
gain jurisdiction, but the states are then tasked with allocating additional 
funds to ensure enforcement. This process does not always occur. 
While tribal self-determination is an admirable goal, it is one that needs 
to be undergone in a gradual manner. As evidenced by the Termination Era, 
the removal of federal programs and oversight can yield breakdowns in 
Indian Country. Tribes are more likely to be located in remote places, 
making access to services beyond the reservation costly or impractical once 
federal support is removed.
257
 Additionally, tribal budgets take into account 
federal funding. Tribes need time to find funds to replace federal support. 
Therefore, the oversight processes that Trump’s administration seeks to 
curtail need to be evaluated to determine if they need to be replaced by 
tribal regulations or processes. These processes must be implemented 
without a lapse period in which lands are leased or alienated without tribal 
approval informed by the impact of the transaction. 
Enabling approval of leases and other land transactions without large 
bureaucratic hurdles may promote tribal energy resource development, but 
it may threaten the continued recognition of tribal sovereignty. As lands are 
alienated, it is more likely that courts will assume tribes no longer have 
jurisdiction over the lands. Erosion of the tribal land base would threaten 
the continuance of the tribe, perhaps without the approval of tribal 
governments and a majority of tribal members. Although this would not be 
termination in name, it could evolve into de facto termination. Sale of lands 
or leasing of lands that were previously utilized as family residences may 
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yield in the movement of tribal members off the reservation. This would 
allow for more energy development of the land, but it could yield a loss of 
cohesion amongst tribal members that threatens the endurance of tribal 
constituencies. Tribal members who move off the reservation will be 
subject to state and federal taxes. In order to meet the requirements of 
monetary obligations off the reservation, members may be forced to 
abandon elements of culture in order to secure profitable jobs.  
A further complicating factor is that with reduced federal oversight of 
tribal lands, the utilization of tribal resources may be up to tribal 
governments who are not always representative of member interests at 
large. After tribes were encouraged to create governments under the IRA, 
some tribes have been governed by systems that are incompatible with 
tribal beliefs and values.
258
 Federal oversight has delayed development of 
tribal resources, but it has also served as additional protection of tribal 
members from tribal government action that is against the best interest of its 
members. The elimination of this barrier could put members at the will of 
governments that are not representative of tribal culture or desires. 
Therefore, reformation of tribal governments and regulations is important 
before removal of existing regulations.  
In any discussion of tribal development, it is important to remember that 
the type of development tribes wish to undergo does not always mirror the 
type of development occurring in the United States at large. Despite the 
belief that energy development on tribal lands may be in the best interest of 
the country, the needs of individual tribes must be considered. It is easy to 
assume that tribes want to develop and turn resources into profit, but that is 
not necessarily the case. Even if that is the case, tribes may be interested in 
different development than what the current administration believes is the 
best plan of action. In the pursuit of self-determination and the observation 
of inherent tribal sovereignty, it is important to include tribes in the 
decision-making process and to allow tribes to pursue their own courses of 
development if regulations and restraints are removed.  
B. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) 
1. Background and Goals 
Occupying a remote part of the country, which became sparsely 
populated by Westerners only later in American history, the treatment of 
Alaskan Natives vastly differed from that of tribes in the lower forty-eight. 
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When the United States entered into a Treaty of Cession with Russia in 
1867, it was announced that the indigenous people living there would be 
“subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to 
time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.”259 The Alaskan 
Statehood Act of 1958 indicated that land and property of Indians, Eskimos, 
and Aleuts was to be held in trust by the United States until further 
congressional action dictated otherwise.
260
 The Statehood Act granted 
Alaska the ability to select 102.5 million acres from public lands.
261
 
However, as the state began to select lands, Native villages objected to 
certain land claims, and the Secretary of the Interior halted patenting until 
the claims could be settled.
262
 The discovery of oil in Alaska prompted the 
resolution of land claims so that development of resources could proceed.
263
 
The land claims were extinguished through the passage in 1971 of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).
264
 While Native Alaskans 
initially supported ANCSA because they believed the Act would recognize 
their land holdings and enable them to maintain their traditional ways of 
life, viewpoints have since evolved.
265
  
2. Statutory Framework 
Beyond freeing up land for oil development,  ANCSA has been claimed 
to have the goal of supporting economic and political independence of 
tribes.
266
 Overall, the Act initially provided for the granting of title to forty 
million acres of land, the provision of $962.5 million to various Native 
groups, and the creation of twelve regional Native corporations and 220 
village corporations to manage benefits awarded by the federal 
                                                                                                             
 259. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His 
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America, Russ.-U.S., art. 3, 
Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539. 
 260. Pub. L. No. 85–508, §  4, 72 Stat. 339, 339. 
 261. Id. § 6(b), 72 Stat. at 340. 
 262. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07(3)(b)(i), at 329 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2012). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971); see Martha Hirschfield, Note, The Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J. 
1331, 1331 (1992). 
 265. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1331. 
 266. Gordon Scott Harrison, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971, 25 ARCTIC 
232, 232 (1972). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/3
No. 2] COMMENTS 343 
 
 
government.
267
 In return for these benefits, Alaska was divided into twelve 
regions that were purportedly based on commonalities in culture amongst 
Alaskan Native groups.
268
 The regions incorporated as  businesses for profit 
under state laws.
269
 One hundred shares of stock in the corporation were 
given to enrolled members of that region.
270
 The village divisions were also 
meant to incorporate.
271
 Stocks were made inalienable for twenty years to 
provide tribes with time to acclimate to the new organization.
272
 Both levels 
of corporations were empowered to hold land, but the title varied based on 
the level of the corporation holding the land.
273
  
The regional and village corporations hold different roles in disbursing 
and managing the settlement. The village corporations were tasked with 
selecting twenty-two million acres of land, with each village receiving land 
proportionately according to the Native population it entailed.
274
 These 
holdings only included the surface estate.
275
 Regional corporations selected 
a total of sixteen million acres of land.
276
 The Secretary of the Interior could 
convey two million additional acres so that the corporations could manage 
significant sites such as cemeteries or historical markers.
277
 These 
landholdings comprise a total of forty million acres of land.
278
 Regional 
corporations hold the subsurface estates of these allocated lands.
279
 An 
elaborate scheme dictates how each region is to distribute a portion of its 
profits to the other regions.
280
 The region is responsible for the monetary 
settlement held in the Alaska Native Fund.
281
 This fund’s contents 
comprised general appropriations in the amount of $462.5 million.
282
 An 
amount of $500 million in mineral revenues is also under regional 
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domain.
283
 Regions receive payment from this fund based on the number of 
shareholders.
284
 
ANCSA’s framework requires the village and regional corporations to 
work together in various ways despite the village corporations not being a 
stockholder or subsidiary of the regional corporations to which they 
report.
285
 During the first five years after the passage of ANCSA, the 
regional corporations oversaw payments from the Alaska Native Fund and 
natural resource revenue to the villages.
286
 The regional corporations had 
the ability to deny funds until village usage plans were approved and had 
the authority to approve the villages’ budgets and articles of 
incorporation.
287
 Regions could compel joint ventures amongst the villages 
to best support the region as a whole.
288
 Even though villages were afforded 
the decision of when subsurface development would occur within their 
domain, accountability became an issue as the surface and subsurface rights 
to a piece of land could be held by different corporations.
289
 
Although the Act purported to address the real and pressing needs of 
Natives in Alaska, it failed to fully address them. Commentators are split 
amongst whether ANCSA posed de facto termination or whether tribes 
were simply transformed into corporations.
290
 Those who argue 
transformation recognize it came with diminished self-determination.
291
 
Native corporations had to make initial expenditures of the settlement funds 
to address essential needs such as housing and drinking water.
292
 Education 
and training were seen as pressing needs as well.
293
 While the resources 
provided by the Act were meant to improve the well-being of villages, the 
corporate model became a hindrance.
294
 Studies conducted after the 
implementation of the Act found that the corporations garnered limited 
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success in promoting the economic well-being of villages.
295
 The corporate 
structure’s success was limited to the small number of jobs the entities 
created.
296
  
The corporations had the goals of not only succeeding financially but 
also providing great changes in the lives of Native Alaskans.
297
 
Unfortunately, both goals were initially undermined by a variety of factors 
that limited the independence of the corporations.
298
 The corporations 
suffered from inexperience and lack of education regarding business.
299
 In 
the twenty years following the enactment of ANCSA, Native corporations 
had differing levels of economic success.
300
 One faced bankruptcy in 1988, 
while another was making more money than the combined income of the 
other Native corporations.
301
 The Act required corporate compliance, which 
funneled out money from company profitability and individual payouts.
302
 
Resources were limited based on inflation in the 1970s, as well as litigation 
over the meaning of ambiguous provisions of ANCSA.
303
 Delays were 
experienced in receiving title to the land.
304
 To counteract these influences, 
some corporations chose to merge.
305
 Others contemplated selling land.
306
 
In 1988, before the twenty-year implementation period was set to expire, 
the ANCSA amendments became law.
307
 Native groups wanted to ensure 
that once the implementation period ended, Natives would retain control 
over corporate membership and the assets of the corporations would be 
protected.
308
 The restraint on alienability of stock in the corporations for the 
twenty-year period had insulated the corporations from external 
pressures.
309
 Were the restraint to be removed, it was feared that outsiders 
could threaten tribal ownership.
310
 The amendments allow the corporations 
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to decide if they would like to extend the restraints on alienability and also 
allow corporations to create different kinds of stock with different voting 
rights.
311
  
Even in areas where the village and the region retain Native ownership, 
conflicts between the two could mean that villages are forced to undergo 
development they do not wish to occur.
312
 The amendments do allow for 
Native Alaskans born after the cutoff date to become stockholders but at the 
discretion of the existing stockholders.
313
 There is a different interest in 
stockholding than that in business at large.
314
 Traditionally, a stockholder 
buys stock with the understanding that it will be alienable.
315
 However, 
stockholding in these corporations depends on Native status and thus serves 
as a symbol of Native cooperation and cultural recognition.
316
 Congress has 
granted quasi-tribal status to these corporations.
317
 Treating them as 
traditional business or private entities is at odds with notions of self-
governance and sovereignty involved in federal Indian law.
318
 
Fearing the development of Indian Country in Alaska, legislators 
involved in the amendments created a settlement trust option that would 
allow for a certain level of protection for some corporate property.
319
 Trusts 
chartered under state law may hold and manage corporate land to promote 
various interests of the tribe.
320
 The trust cannot hold any subsurface 
estates, and regional corporations can prevent villages from placing land in 
trust.
321
 The trust is not allowed to convey land it holds to Natives without 
ANCSA stock.
322
  
3. Impacts 
Although the amendments do allow for the continuation of restraints on 
alienation, these protections can be eliminated by a majority vote.
323
 The 
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protections of ANCSA provide that the stock is to remain in Native hands 
until the twenty-year period expires.
324
 That meant that after December 18, 
1991, stock would become freely alienable.
325
 The amendments allow a 
corporation to continue restraints on alienability or to discontinue it.
326
 The 
fate of corporate stock may be at the whim of a majority vote.
327
 
Recapitalization of stock is enabled through the amendments in which a 
corporation could create different levels of stock corresponding to different 
rights.
328
 If this were to occur, stock held by Native Alaskans could be 
reduced in power such that voting could be skewed in the direction of non-
Indian stockholders.
329
 The requirements surrounding the trust are 
problematic because subsurface rights cannot be placed in trust.
330
 To get 
benefits from them, the corporation must continue to exist.
331
 If the profits 
dwindle, Native people may have to end the corporation and lose the 
subsurface rights.
332
  
Although corporations have potential to become highly profitable and to 
encourage self-determination, placing intricate business decisions in the 
hands of people without experience or training in the area places them at a 
strong disadvantage.
333
 Many of the Native shareholders are not familiar 
with business.
334
 The economic struggles of the corporations often put the 
stockholders in a position where they must sell or lose land rights in order 
to avoid debt.
335
 Natives are forced to make decisions not according to 
independent action, but according to survival.
336
 
While ANCSA has increased Native visibility in Alaskan politics, it has 
not been as successful at increasing the general welfare of Alaskan 
Natives.
337
 Natives still rely greatly on welfare. Even with welfare benefits 
figured in, an estimated twenty-five percent of Native Alaskans lived below 
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the poverty level in 1989.
338
 Over half of Native Alaskans over sixteen-
years-old were unemployed in 1985.
339
 There is a disparity of outcomes 
between rural and urban Alaskan Natives.
340
 In rural areas, some culture 
and language are preserved, but assistance is needed to provide tools with 
which to carry out traditional practices.
341
 These rural communities require 
financial aid to afford hunting tools and utilities, as well as service 
support.
342
 In villages not engaged in commercial fishing, around eighty 
percent of jobs resulted from  state expenditures in 1989.
343
 
Having endured assimilative and other destructive pressures before the 
passage of ANCSA, the failures of the Act to provide needed benefits has 
led to a variety of social problems.
344
 For example, mental illness and 
suicide especially impact young adult males.
345
  
ANCSA attacks tribal sovereignty traditionally afforded to tribes because 
sovereignty that is typically viewed as inherent within the tribe is partially 
granted to Alaskan Natives based on land grants to private entities that 
allow for limited tribal autonomy. ANCSA reduces recognized tribal 
sovereignty because it recognizes land holdings as grants from the federal 
government.
346
 While a tribe may be able to retain sovereignty without 
landholdings, a separation of land and governance weakens a tribe’s 
autonomy.
347
 Market influences can dictate how corporations are managed 
apart from tribal wishes.
348
 When Natives are limited to operating within 
the constraints of a corporation, it becomes difficult to provide for 
communities.
349
 Corporations do not have the full functionality of a 
government.
350
 Their sovereign action is limited.
351
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4. Application to Trump Administration Policies and Goals 
ANCSA provides a warning for downplaying Indian interests in pursuit 
of energy development. ANCSA was a result of a similar climate of 
American energy dominance.
352
 The Trump administration has not made 
direct statements indicating a desire to privatize Indian land or transform 
tribal holdings into corporate holdings, but the aftermath of ANCSA 
provides key takeaways to remember when addressing tribal energy 
development and harmonizing this with American energy interests. 
While utilizing previously dormant lands may yield initial profits, 
forcing development on tribes erodes tribal sovereignty, even when tribes 
have a role in subsequent development. Under ANCSA, tribal governments 
were transformed into corporations.
353
 While these corporations have 
control in business decisions, the tribes were denied the large decision 
regarding transformation into a corporate entity under state law. Tribes are 
no longer able to assert full sovereignty because businesses do not perform 
all of the same functions as a government. Additionally, tribes are required 
to adhere to state corporate laws.
354
 This means that tribal sovereigns have 
to yield to the power of the state. Market pressures can turn choices into 
forced action in order to preserve some tribal power. If corporations go 
bankrupt, tribes lose access to subsurface resources.
355
 The framework of 
the corporate structure means that not only the state has power over a 
tribe’s actions but so do other tribes.356 Regional corporations can dictate 
some actions of the village corporations.
357
 These regional corporations are 
made up of several Native groups that may have divergent goals and 
cultural considerations.
358
 
Decisions made by the Trump administration could potentially erode 
tribal sovereignty in a similar way that ANCSA has, by forcing tribes to 
adhere to new regulations. While tribes have been subject to federal 
oversight as part of the federal-tribal trust relationship for many years, 
removing long-standing limitations on Indian actions with regards to land 
could erode the tribal land base without the tribe’s consent. This is why it is 
essential that tribes have their own regulations and processes in place in 
anticipation of changes in federal oversight. Without tribal processes, tribes 
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may lose land holdings and therefore power. Additionally, while the Trump 
administration is wise in including tribal leaders and states in discussions 
on regulatory reform, it is important to learn from ANCSA that allowing 
other tribes and states to assert authority over a particular tribe’s 
landholdings further erodes sovereignty and undermines tribal interests.
359
 
Discussions amongst diverse groups may provide insights into reforms, but 
if success is to occur, it is important that individual tribes have authority 
over the development of their own land. This ensures that tribes have the 
fullest sovereign authority possible to cater development to local needs and 
beliefs. 
ANCSA made lands inalienable for a portion of years, which may pose a 
possible option for tribal development if many restraints on alienation are 
removed.
360
 If the Trump administration does push for privatization of lands 
or the removal of restraints on land, it may be in tribes’ best interest to keep 
lands unalienable for a period to ensure that tribal mechanisms are in place 
to retain tribal land holdings. In the first years after the enactment of 
ANCSA, tribes allocated money to the most pressing issues, including 
healthcare and schooling.
361
 If restraints on alienation had not been put in 
place, tribal members could have sought immediate money to address these 
needs by selling shares, meaning that holdings could have quickly fallen out 
of tribal control. A similar process could take place if restraints on 
alienation were removed under the Trump administration. In tribal areas 
where necessities are not met, tribal members may be encouraged to 
address immediate concerns despite these actions risking the continuance of 
tribal authority. 
When individuals make decisions that will personally impact them, 
responsible regulations and policies are more likely to be created. Under the 
ANCSA framework, regional corporations could make decisions without 
the approval of village corporations.
362
 This framework meant that the 
regional corporation could pursue its overall best interest without regard to 
individual village welfare. In order to maintain the corporation, profit may 
be prioritized over the welfare of Native Alaskans. Therefore, 
individualized plans of action with regard to energy development on tribal 
lands should be created at the tribal level and should be undertaken by 
traditional governments rather than tribal corporations. Not only would this 
enable tribes to consider their individual needs, it would also mean that 
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more thought could be given to tribal endurance and environmental 
sustainability. 
The status of Native Alaskans after ANCSA creates confusion that 
inhibits tribal action. Native Alaskan villages are considered quasi-tribal.
363
 
They do not have the same rights and recognition as tribes in the lower 
forty-eight states, but they retain a level of federal recognition.
364
 The 
removal of restraints on Indian lands in the continental United States, 
accompanied by reductions in regulations, could yield discussions relating 
to the extent of the tribal-federal relationship. It is important that these 
questions are resolved with tribal input and made sufficiently clear so that 
tribes can pursue development without needing to litigate questions of 
authority. Leaving unanswered questions regarding federal authority in 
tribal development would mean expensive litigation or stalls in tribal plans.  
IV. Conclusion 
Both the Termination Era and ANCSA warn against changes in federal 
Indian policy without consultation with tribal governments and deep 
conversations into the possible impacts of policy. While reductions in 
federal oversight may be vital steps in allowing for the development of 
tribal resources, the federal government must recognize the importance of 
preserving tribal sovereignty. Tribes must be given time and authority to 
implement individualized regulations that come into effect before federal 
protections are removed. Without the allowance of sufficient time to 
implement protective measures, tribes are at risk of de facto termination. 
However, if the federal government works closely with tribal governments, 
removal of federal oversight could enhance a tribe’s ability to utilize fuller 
sovereignty. 
The Termination Era warns that policy must be informed by the 
understanding that Indian status is a political, and not a racial, 
classification. Although racial equality is an important goal, inequalities in 
the treatment of tribes raise different questions than disparate treatment 
amongst people of different races. Federally recognized tribes have a 
special relationship with the federal government. This relationship comes 
with responsibilities that are not necessarily owed to other groups. Tribes as 
sovereigns have different interests than other minority groups.  
In order to maintain their rights as sovereigns, tribes usually need access 
to land, a body of constituents, and resources. Deregulation of the 
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bureaucracy created to oversee tribal actions may have a great impact on 
tribes’ access to these essential elements. When restraints on alienation of 
lands are removed without tribal regulations or laws on the disposition of 
land, individual members may decide single-handedly to decrease the 
tribe’s landholdings. This would be similar to a United States citizen selling 
his land to another nation, removing the land from the United States’ 
control. Such actions could greatly undermine the functioning of a 
government that needs land to assert jurisdiction. If the tribal-federal 
relationship were sufficiently transformed so that greater state control was 
present in Indian Country, Indians and their land could be subject to state 
taxes. These taxes would not only limit the amount of income individual 
Indians receive, regardless of where the income came from, but would also 
decrease the amount of money tribes held. Reduction in land and income 
limits sovereignty in that tribes have more limited courses of action.  
When PL 280 was passed, federal authority was replaced with state 
authority, and federal funding was removed. This same process could 
happen if the federal government were to remove oversight of tribal land 
holdings and allow for greater state participation. If tribes do not have 
sufficient revenue apart from federal aid, even if tribal regulations are 
passed, there may be insufficient funds to carry them out. States could 
attempt to assert their own regulations, which could yield confusion over 
sovereign authority. Confusion may inhibit tribal action and energy 
development. The best course of action if the federal government wished to 
reduce federal oversight would be to give tribes support and time to 
implement their own regulations to take the place of similar federal rules. 
Any intrusion of tribal authority by state authority needs to be fully 
discussed with the potentially impacted tribes. Robust conversations 
between tribes and the federal government would include the structure of 
the tribal government and its ability to carry out the functions the federal 
government has previously provided. Reducing federal oversight 
diminishes federal protection of tribal members from unwise decisions of 
the tribal government. This reality further indicates the importance of tribal 
regulations to replace this function, as well as a capable government to 
implement the regulations. 
Although it is time-consuming, the most effective manner to alter federal 
control over land in Indian Country is to address each tribe individually. 
Some tribes will have larger governments that are capable of enforcing their 
own regulations and adjudicating disputes. Other tribes may lack judicial 
systems or well-staffed governments and require more time to develop 
these. ANCSA indicates that one possible way to allow for a transition of 
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power is to place a terminable restraint on the alienation of lands. Once 
tribes are satisfied with their abilities to direct land sales themselves, they 
may remove federal restrictions. Tribes will likely have different opinions 
on energy development and the relationship they wish to have with the 
federal government. Respecting tribal sovereignty should entail respecting a 
tribe’s individual plans for energy development. 
ANCSA warns against unilateral choices by the federal government in 
Indian Country. While freeing lands for energy development may allow for 
lucrative resource extraction, it leaves a lasting mark on those whose voices 
were silenced in the process. This is not to say that resource development 
should not take place but rather that it should be the result of collaborations 
between all parties involved. The structure of ANCSA enabled different 
Native groups to control the actions of others. This inhibits Native Alaskan 
groups from practicing self-determination. In the lower forty-eight states, it 
is important that individual tribes control actions regarding lands under 
their domain. It should be remembered that tribes are individual sovereigns 
and not a collective whole. Additionally, local action at the tribal level is 
more likely to take into account the impacts development will have on 
individual tribal members and the environment. When groups who will face 
the consequences of the action make the decision to take the action, more 
thought will hopefully be given to environmental sustainability and human 
welfare. 
While it may appear that the federal government can consider Indian 
interests adequately without always receiving tribal input, a recent action of 
the executive branch warns against hasty action without local cooperation 
and insight. The Trump administration recently vocalized that it will “cease 
all implementation” of the Paris Climate Accord.365 The National Congress 
of American Indians reports that climate change has a disproportionate 
impact on tribes, and therefore, President Trump’s intent to withdraw from 
the Paris Climate Accord may have larger impacts on tribal development 
than elsewhere in the country.
366
 The locale of reservations and the 
continuance of subsistence practices by some tribes mean that impacts on 
climate can affect health, food supply, and culture.
367
 These are realities that 
may not enter the discussion at the federal level but nonetheless are vital 
considerations for well-rounded decision-making. 
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